#259 Playing the Long Game
NEET and Neeti, Why India Should Champion Labour Mobility, Agnipath via Inverse Induction, and more
India Policy Watch #1: NEET And Neeti
Policy issues relevant to India
— RSJ
Here’s an interesting puzzle for you on a Sunday morning. There’s a test you take that has 180 questions in it. A correct answer to a question will fetch you four marks. An incorrect answer has a penalty, and you get docked one mark for it. If you don’t attempt a question, you get nothing (obviously) and you aren’t docked marks for it too.
All clear? Good.
Here’s the question, then. What are the top three scores possible for anyone to get in this test?
Well, it isn’t that difficult to arrive at the answer. If you answer all 180 questions correctly, you get a score of 720. If you get 179 of the right and you didn’t attempt the remaining one question, you end up with 716. And lastly, if you get 179 right but get that other question wrong, you get docked a mark from your score of 716, and you end up with 715. Therefore, the top 3 scores in a test of this kind are 720, 716 and 715.
Easy. What’s the big deal about this, you may ask? Well, that’s not the promised puzzle for you. The puzzle comes now. A total of 2.4 million students took the test described above on May 5, and a month later, the results were published. Explain how a bunch of students ended up with a score of 719 or 718.
Now, there’s a real puzzle. And this is what hit millions of parents and students on June 4 (the same day those other results were also streaming in) when the results for NEET were published. NEET is a nationwide common, mandatory test for admission into undergraduate medical programmes across various colleges in India. In 2019 it became the sole entrance test for getting into such programmes despite lawsuits opposing it and reservations of many to such an idea. Yet it was legislated into an Act because we love “One Nation, One X” (insert anything you may want for X). An autonomous body called the National Testing Agency (NTA) was set up to conduct the common entrance examination. And the NTA is what served up the puzzling scores of 719 and 718 on June 4.
The answer to this head-scratcher? Well, the NTA offered that uniquely Indian concept called “grace marks” to explain this away. Here’s the official statement from NTA:
"NTA received few representations and Court Cases from the candidates of NEET (UG) 2024 raising concerns of loss of time during the conduct of the examination on 05.05.2024. Such cases/representations were considered by NTA and the normalisation formula, which has been devised and adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, vide its Judgment dated 13.06.2018, was implemented to address the loss of time faced by the candidates. 1563 candidates were compensated for the loss of time and the revised marks of such candidates vary from -20 to 720 marks. Amongst these, the score of two candidates also happens to be 718 and 719 marks respectively due to compensatory marks,” the NTA stated.
There are a few new head-scratchers here. First, why couldn’t the NTA disclose this at the time of publication of results? That could have eliminated the intrigue that set in with those “impossible” scores. Second, there’s a lack of clarity on whether the SC judgment in 2018, which was used to grant grace marks, actually applies to NEET as it was filed under category 3100 - Admission To Educational Institutions Other Than Medical & Engineering. Third, there was no official announcement that if students have “lost time” during the test because of the shortcomings of the NTA, they could appeal to the NTA or to the courts for them to be granted “grace marks”. There might have been more than just the 1563 candidates then who might have appealed for “lost time” compensation had this process been made public. Lastly, it is remarkable that despite this additional wrinkle of figuring out who was eligible for “grace marks”, the NTA actually concluded the process ten days earlier than scheduled. And while it did, it made no attempts to check for any other anomalous pattern in its results which have come up as people have dug deeper into the results.
As many news outlets have already reported, there has been a significant jump in the number of candidates who have got what are considered top scores in NEET. For instance, in the past five years or so, typically 2-3 students got a perfect score of 720. That has gone up to 67 in 2024. Across every slab from 720 to 650 (which is considered the entry threshold for a top score), the number of students in 2024 is between 3.5 and 5 times the past trends. And no, the number of students who applied for NEET this year was only up 15 per cent. Nor was the test paper any easier than usual for such a big uptick in performance. Either we were blessed with a really bright cohort of students, or something was amiss.
Other anomalies also showed up.
A single centre in that bastion of educational excellence, Bahadurgarh, Haryana, had six perfect scores of 720. The other details about these students also didn’t seem to add up. As is wont, all kinds of other complaints also started pouring in to muddy the waters further. Even the events leading up to the results were not without their share of controversies. For instance, the dates for registration for the test were changed arbitrarily, there were news reports of paper “leaks”, and police cases filed in Bihar a day before the test, and in a feat of extraordinary efficiency displayed by a government agency, the test results originally scheduled to be published on June 14 were advanced by ten days to June 4 to mysteriously coincide with the results of the Lok Sabha elections that day.
The case is now with the Supreme Court that scrapped the decision on grace marks and then ordered a re-test on June 23, 2024 for the 1563 students who were officially awarded those marks. The bench also decided to transfer the multiple ongoing cases in several high courts against NEET to the Supreme Court to streamline the process. The next hearing with all the cases taken together will be on July 8. It is unlikely that the current results will be scrapped, as is being demanded by several petitioners. We will just mark 2024 down as a year when students just got significantly better.
The whole saga concerning NTA, which has had previous incarnations in other tests like CUET and JEE, without being as egregious as this, will continue in the future, too. because there is unlikely to be a real attempt at understanding what actually has gone wrong in this case and what could possibly go wrong in the future. The primary goal of bureaucracy is to perpetuate bureaucracy, after all. There are more fundamental issues here that need a deeper introspection.
First, why do we have only about 100,000 seats every year for admission into medical programs across India? Of these, only about a third are possibly any good. The rest are plagued with poor infrastructure, limited faculty and programs that can, at best, be considered dubious, like the various AYUSH colleges that have sprung up. It is a question we have covered extensively in previous editions when we explained why we often find Indian medical students stranded in Ukraine and other strife-torn regions. The regulations around setting up and running a medical college are such that we can never keep up with the demand for medical professionals that our country needs. So, we have the cost of medical education that continues to become prohibitively high and a staggering focus on a single exam for students to come good.
Second, why should the government be in the business of administering these tests? It can accredit institutions, set the guidelines for the test and set up a governance mechanism to monitor the quality of the test. Why does it need to have an agency to run these tests? The usual issues of concentrating such powers into a single body come up. The government isn’t a subject matter expert in conducting tests, and soon, its lack of expertise shows up. The possibility of ‘leaks’ goes up because of the possibility of officials being bribed or someone in the hierarchy breaking protocol. And even if such possibilities exist if the test were to be conducted by a private player, the likelihood of cover-up, lack of transparency on what went wrong and accountability for missteps will be very different in an agency that’s run by the state.
Lastly, there’s something wrong with a system where students' futures depend on a single 200-minute test that’s common to all and that happens only once a year. This creates enormous stress for students, provides fertile ground for coaching institutes that train students to “solve” the tests to thrive, and sets up wrong incentives for everyone involved in the process to be amenable to malpractices.
Like always, it is about elimination rather than selection of students for courses that fit their aptitude.
P.S.: Here’s our edition explaining the real reason why Indian MBBS students end up in places like Kyrgyzstan.
India Policy Watch #2: How to Improve Agnipath?
Policy issues relevant to India
— Pranay Kotasthane
In the previous edition, I briefly explored three options for improving the Agnipath scheme. This week, I developed one of these options in an article for the Indian Express. Here’s the section of this article that explains the reform idea.
The bone of contention right now is what happens to the 75 per cent of every Agniveer cohort that is let go from the armed forces after the four-year contract ends. Apprehension about the future prospects of such cohorts led to mass protests in 2022. Thus, a solution that retains this section of Agniveers in the broader national security system can address these concerns. Here’s how.
The alternative, called Inverse Induction, was proposed by us [Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon and I] in a Takshashila Discussion Document (September 2019). The name implies that the recruitment of Agniveers first happens through the Central and State Armed Police Forces (CAPF/SAPF) and not the Indian armed forces directly. These new CAPF recruits are then inducted into the Indian armed forces for a colour service of seven years. The Indian armed forces train the incoming personnel per their standards for one year, after which they serve for six years. After the Agniveer term ends, the recruit is sent back to the parent CAPF. They undergo reorientation training for around three months and are then absorbed on duty along with the retention of their seniority in the parent CAPF/SAPF. Retirees receive pensions as applicable to the recruiting CAPF. On exiting the national security system at any point after their colour service in the armed forces, Agniveers are entitled to receive their SevaNidhi package, which accumulates on account of their term in the Indian armed forces.
Defence pension savings come from two pathways. First, the personnel are retained within the National Security System for a longer period of time, as the retirement age for all CAPF personnel is 60. Second, the pension bill per Agniveer is lower as the CAPF/SAPF provide pensions as per the National Pension System (NPS). Unlike OROP, NPS is a “defined contribution” scheme, where the pension is paid out of a corpus the employee co-creates using their own salary package. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence does not have to bear the pension burden since CAPF/SAPF falls outside their funding mandate. Our thumb rule is that the pension savings achieved per recruit amount to a net present value of Rs 1 crore.
The proposed inverse induction model can effectively address the three main objections to the Agnipath. First, retaining the soldiers in the national security system alleviates the concerns of those disheartened by the exit from the armed forces after four years of gruelling service. Secondly, there are likely to be significant positive effects— the recruiting paramilitary organisations’ combat capabilities will improve due to the training of Agniveers by the armed forces. It will also build state capacity in the severely understaffed state armed police forces. Thirdly, extending the service term to seven years can also address the operational concerns of the armed forces as a shorter service term and high turnover are believed by some to reduce military effectiveness.
In short, Agnipath can be improved through inverse induction. The National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) first proposed a variant of this model in 2015. The proposal was accepted by the Defence Ministry but not by the Home Ministry. Political intervention is required for the Home Ministry to change its stance. Tackling the fiscal problems of the national security system requires a whole-of-government approach.
India Policy Watch #3: India Should Sign Free Mobility Agreements (FMAs)
Policy issues relevant to India
— Pranay Kotasthane
Overseas Indians have been in the news over the last couple of weeks. Last week, there was much joy as we admired the remarkable achievements of cricketers Saurabh Netrawalkar and Harmeet Singh. The two Indians who hold American green cards remind us that India’s most widely felt global economic contribution over the next decade will be the export of its young talent. But just a few days later came the tragic news of 50 Indians dying in a Kuwait building fire. This accident again brought into focus the urgent need for upgrading India’s emigration laws. So, in this edition, let’s reflect on the Indian government’s approach to international labour mobility.
The Geopolitics of Talent has Just Begun
Many rich countries no longer have a demographic ‘pyramid’ but a demographic ‘tea pot’ due to high dependency ratios. There are fewer youngsters and kids than there are retirees. This is leading to worker shortages across industries even as the world is witnessing a spate of ambitious industrial policies. Take the case of the American and German semiconductor manufacturing build-up, which is being hobbled by worker shortages at all levels, from engineers to skilled construction workers.
Their only option is opening up to foreign workers. But we are also amidst a global wave of populism, and populists of all hues enjoy turning the ‘insiders’ against the ‘outsiders’. So don’t expect these ageing countries to hike their immigration quotas suddenly.
One thing is for sure. As the West adjusts to its demographic reality, a larger number of Indians will have the option of working abroad. Until the generation-long project of improving the livability of Indian cities and upgrading the state of education and research in Indian universities materialises, many skilled Indians across the income spectrum would prefer to migrate abroad.
Because emigration is a voluntary act, the Indian state must not put exit barriers for those who want to leave India. But at the aggregate level, is it possible for India to design policies that allow it to tap the energies and capabilities of emigrants? This will be a crucial question for India’s development journey.
Trade Markets for Mobility (TMFM)
One piece of this puzzle for India is labour mobility agreements. The more Indians work abroad and return home afterwards, the better for India’s growth prospects. That’s where labour mobility agreements become relevant.
Imagine a world where India signs an agreement with a friendly country that allows Indians to work abroad for a fixed period—say about ten years—on a visa that explicitly discourages a pathway towards citizenship in the other country. This proposition will be attractive to the rich world, as citizenship is explicitly off the table. The fears of ‘outsiders ruining our unique way of life’ would become less emotive when these outsiders are temporary guest workers rather than potentially permanent citizens. More importantly, such agreements will open up opportunities for many more Indians to work abroad. As these Indians return after having completed their work term, they would also help India at an aggregate level by facilitating the transfer of technologies, knowledge, and better practices.
This idea flows from the concept of ‘rotational labour mobility’ developed by economist Lant Pritchett and LaMP (Labour Mobility Partnerships). Pritchett distinguishes open borders from labour mobility, arguing that the former might be more desirable but is also unfeasible, while the idea of rotational labour movement might be a win-win for all stakeholders.
China’s experience offers some clues. Once its economy boomed, its cities became more livable, and its universities improved, there were many takers for governmental programmes to attract emigrants back from the West. These ‘returnees’ played a crucial role in kicking off China’s science and technology progress.
How to Get it Done?
India needs to champion the cause of labour mobility. However, doing so requires many elements to fall into place. Manish Sabharwal and Chinmay Tumbe lay out the essential conditions in an Indian Express opinion piece:
“It’s time to put some Indian diplomatic heft behind demonstrating the benefits to hosts, senders and workers of guest workers. In parallel, a professionalised, private sector labour mobility industry could address the concerns of wealthy country voters, including domestic worker impact, social tensions, orderly movement, timely return without visa overstays, social security benefits without paying costs, skill certification with worker-employer fit, worker exploitation, and security background checks. Immense risks of abuse mean this industry must be carefully regulated and monitored, and LAMP believes an ethical global mobility service could be a force for good while being a $30 billion industry.” [Indian Express]
To start off, India should think about Free Mobility Agreements (FMAs) in conjunction with Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). FTAs are being signed with friendly nation-states. But most often, they fall prey to bean-counting by Commerce Departments, who are squabbling for reciprocal tariff relaxations. India could take a different approach. Instead of negotiating tariff reductions, it should negotiate for enhanced fixed-term labour mobility of its citizens.
To draw a parallel, just as China used the leverage of its significant domestic market to access technology from MNCs (known as the Trade Markets for Technology strategy or TMFT), India could use its domestic market leverage for labour mobility (call it Trade Markets for Mobility or TMFM).
Today, India is seen as a ‘China+1’ manufacturing partner by Western firms. But as China turns inward, India should aim to become a ‘China+1’ talent partner for the world. Free Mobility Agreements (FMAs) must become an essential part of India’s geoeconomic strategy. Getting the geopolitics of talent right will be crucial.
India Policy Watch #4: More On Results 2024
Policy issues relevant to India
— RSJ
Here are a few extracts of Pratap Bhanu Mehta, in Foreign Affairs, summing up the other results that were out on June 4, 2024. First on the case for natural limits of Hindu consolidation:
“The BJP seeks to consolidate Hindus and elide caste distinctions, thereby cementing a large block of voters. Fresh conflicts among castes over access to government benefits will undermine the BJP’s attempt to project Hindu unity. The more caste becomes a basis of distributive politics, the more it militates against Hindu consolidation. The opposition has backed a caste census, as has Kumar’s main opponent in Bihar, convinced that mobilization along caste lines enjoys popular legitimacy and carries the imprimatur of social justice. In principle, the BJP could simply compromise on this issue and solidify its social justice credentials. But compromising would weaken Modi’s authority within his own party’s base and dilute the BJP’s claims to a distinctive ideology.
And then on the possibility of a revised Modi brand.
“As much as Modi’s critics are buoyed by his weakening, his third term may augur a period of tumult. A sense of relief now pervades Indian civil society, with many hoping that the government will allow more space for dissent. This hope will soon be tested, however. The Indian economy has enough momentum to sustain a high rate of growth that will continue to attract trade partners and foreign investors. But the growth will be uneven, resulting in significant pockets of disenchantment, especially among farmers and the educated unemployed. An emboldened opposition—and alliance partners driving a hard bargain—will prevent an inexorable concentration of power in the persona of Modi and in the office of the prime minister. But it will also make institutions more an object of contention. The ruling coalition will still try to use them to divide and weaken the opposition, either through the allure of office or the threat of punitive investigation. In turn, the opposition will be able to mobilize more street power in response. After a brief period of political calm, the fault lines around caste and religion will in all likelihood become deeper. The nature of the party system and the incentives for individual leaders make that almost inevitable.
Indian democracy has been rescued from the abyss. But a lot will depend on the choices Modi makes. In this election, he was, like many authoritarian figures, a victim of his own self-image. In the past decade, voters have applauded and welcomed his projection of power. For many voters, however, Modi’s cult of personality had crossed the line into delusional hubris. Modi misjudged them. They did not necessarily repudiate his building of the Ram temple or his welfare schemes, but they wanted concrete solutions to their current problems—not the relentless trumpeting of past achievements. Even with the media largely on his side, Modi crashed into a newly skeptical electorate. If he is to regain their confidence, his self-aggrandizement will have to give way to humility, openness, and less control. This could well be a tall order for a leader so used to thinking of himself as ten feet tall.”
HomeWork
Reading and listening recommendations on public policy matters
[Article] In the context of the Kuwait fire tragedy, our post on discarding the Emigration Clearance System from 2018 is relevant. There’s another good article on this theme by Rejimon Kuttappan in the Hindustan Times.
[Podcast] This Ideas of India episode discusses rotational labour mobility in some detail.
[Podcast] Over at Puliyabaazi, we have a fourth episode in our series on the evolution of the Indian language constellation.
[Video] There’s a lot of misreporting and misunderstanding on the notion of the ‘Special Category Status’ for states. Skip the noise and just listen to this explanation by Dr Govinda Rao.
[Journal] The latest issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy has some excellent articles, including How India Can Reach Net Zero: A Strategy for 2025–35, by Montek S Ahluwalia and Utkarsh Patel, and Global Economic Order and Global Economic Governance, by Daniel Susskind and David Vines.
Re: neet and neeti
I can't help but feel that rsj's solution misses a number of problems that neet was trying to fix.
It's not about one nation one x, except superficially.
1, the variation in admission procedures was much higher than could be tolerated, so that there was no minimum standard or uniform understanding of merit
2, paper leaks were happening in some states already
3, the law demands that even private medical colleges be not for profit. For better or worse. In that situation, the idea of capitation fees was abhorrent.
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Arguably neet has had benefits as well as a huge downside
1, the high stakes examination means that coaching has become even more of an industry than it used to be
2, the fact of a single medical/nursing exam has meant an improvement in the quality of nursing students, as it includes a number who just missed out on medicine
3, neet selects for skills that aren't necessary to be a doctor
4, neet takes away the options for states or college to use their selection criteria as a way to select a particular kind of student. Eg CMC Vellore chose those who could reason and who were deemed socially b
Wrt Mobility Agreements, the Indians would indeed become a guest, for let's say 10 years.
What does the potential impact look like?
1. They approach their stay as merely a temporary one. The sole focus would be to earn more and save more. So that it can be spent once they're back in the country. Rather than "living", it would become more like an "earning mission", given how the Indian sensibilities work.
When these people come back, and I'd assume this is a large number, the large amount of money that they bring in (especially considering they'd have been earning in USD or Euros), wouldn't that drive up inflation artificially? Also, wouldn't this disapore give rise to a new class of high asset worth individuals who have massive lobbying power? (I mean, the China experiment isn't really all that much about human rights and democracy, is it?)
2. Even the companies or brands that they join will treat them only as a disposable resource. They know there is little long term future to be expected from such workers. They'd be rarely preferred in management positions. Would stories like Satya Nadella and Sundar Pichai be a reality anymore?
3. Really just a forward consequence of (1) and (2), would it also not hinder Indian entreprenuers in foreign countries? Think Vinod Khosla and Gupta brothers in Africa.