#250 When You Ignore the Unintended...
An Apple A Day For US DoJ, Insoluble Water Problems, Insoluble Alcohol Excise Problems, and a Poor Defence of Wealth Tax
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Global Policy Watch: An Apple A Day For US DoJ
Global policy issues relevant to India
— RSJ
One of the predictions I made at the start of the year was that US antitrust authorities (FTC, DoJ, etc.) were working against the clock to file suits against Big Tech before the end of the current Biden administration. Therefore, I wasn’t surprised to find an eighty-eight-page document from DoJ suing Apple for maintaining an illegal monopoly over its iPhone ecosystem and, in the process, harming the interests of customers and developers.
But why they seem to be in such a hurry is beyond me. It is not like if they don’t get voted back to power, the Trump administration will undo everything they have done against Big Tech so far. In fact, suspicion of Big Tech is possibly the only thing that’s common to both the Democratic and the Republican camps. The left-leaning wing within Team Biden, which seems to have taken over this part of the administration, believes Big Tech abuses its monopoly power and harms consumers. In what ways I seem to have difficulty in understanding. For instance, when the FTC sued Amazon last year, the gist of their complaint was Amazon keeps its prices low now to lure customers in. It will surely raise it in future, so we must act now to prevent a future crime. That’s Orwellian enough. Their other grouse was that by keeping its prices low and making losses, it doesn’t allow other small companies from entering into the market who will presumably charge more than Amazon. How that would be good for customers wasn’t clear to me. Anyway, the idea behind that lawsuit was that even if Amazon made losses, it should be controlled so that it wouldn’t make supernormal profits in the future.
Going through the Apple suit, the argument is that it has created a closed ‘garden’ for its customers that prevents them from freely interfacing with other competing operating systems or devices. This locks in the customers, and from there, Apple leverages this moat to charge developers and other apps exorbitant sums to access this user base. I have some sympathy for some of this argument. But not much. There’s no monopoly Apple has for any customer to choose an iPhone or iPad to begin with. These products tend to be expensive, and the market is full of smartphones that promise better features at lower prices. The customers choose Apple, often queuing up at storefronts and paying a significant premium because it has some strange alchemy of design chops, innovation and brand image that they feel is worth it. Customers have the choice not to buy it, and in most markets, they have exercised it quite well. Once you’re an Apple customer, you can leave it if you so desire. Apple is possibly a better guardian of customers’ data than most Big Tech companies and it does so by keeping a fairly tight control over who they allow into their ecosystem. If regulators want to level the playing field for the services Apple charges to the app and developer community, there are multiple ways of doing it (as the EU has done just last week) than to go full tilt at breaking it up. It is no wonder Apple has promised to fight it out. And even that is somewhat irrelevant because I suspect a lot of this is merely political posturing at this moment in the election cycle. After all, the antitrust process can take years, with multiple levels of litigation at various courts before a final decision is taken. This is understood by all parties involved. The salvos that will be fired between now and November will be performative to a large extent.
Separately, I was quite taken in by this interview with Lina Khan, the chair of FTC, that she gave to Ink, an online publication this week.
I have quoted her responses below, which seem to suggest we are in some kind of civilisational conflict with Big Tech. I will leave you to judge for yourself.
“You have millions of consumers, thousands of producers, controlled by a handful of companies. These gatekeepers, these dominant middlemen and intermediaries, they play an important function, but the power they've consolidated allows them to pick winners and losers and to enrich themselves as they extract more and more, both from the producers that are actually making stuff and the consumers that are buying it. They’re creating markets that, to a lot of people, just don't seem fair.
You've seen more and more power consolidated and concentrated, and that power being exercised in ways that make other people poorer and more subject to arbitrary whims, and that make them feel more coerced and less free.
One of the original insights of the anti-monopoly tradition in leading up to the passage of the antitrust laws, was that in the same way that we have checks and balances in our political sphere to guard against concentration of political power, that we similarly needed the antitrust laws to safeguard against concentrations of economic power. It was recognized that you really need safeguards on both sides to create real liberty and real democracy.”
In the history of free market capitalism, I struggle to find a single company that has sustained any period of real market dominance that went beyond three decades. But I can quote you many examples of organisations that have sustained monopoly because they were safeguarded by the state with the idea of safeguarding people from market monopolies. This has played out not too far back in time. There's a living memory of this across nations.
In response to another question, Lina Khan has this response:
“What do you think is the biggest source of anti-competitive behavior out there that you don't currently have the power to regulate because of what the law is?
There are several lawsuits underway against these dominant digital platforms, like Facebook and Amazon. So depending on what the court ends up determining there, we'll send a signal to Congress about where the law might further need to be fixed.
One of the real limitations we face at the FTC is that we can't get money back for people, even when money's been wrongfully taken by monopolies. So if you have a pharma monopoly, for example, that through all sorts of anti-competitive tactics lifts millions or billions of dollars from people, we can go into court and ask the court to stop those practices, but we can't actually get the money back.
And so that can create a real incentive problem. Lawbreakers are able to profit from lawbreaking, and if they get caught, a court will say, "OK, stop," but we're not actually able to make the victims whole and make sure that those companies have to give up their unlawfully gained profit. So how do you stop the cheating? Ensuring that the cheaters can't profit from cheating is a key part of that, and so that's where I would say strengthening the law is quite important.”
So, the idea is to not just ex-ante take decisions anticipating market gouging pricing like in the case of the suit against Amazon, but also to aim for going back in time and extracting money out of these enterprises for supposedly running a monopoly in the past when there was no case against them.
It is a bizarre argument, and worse, it is a dangerous argument from someone who chairs the FTC. It is how you kill enterprise.
India Policy Watch #1: Insoluble Water Problems
Policy issues relevant to India
— RSJ
The water crisis in Bangalore and other cities has brought to the fore again the real problem of urban management in India. It is difficult to know where to begin looking for a solution. The classic government response is to blame people who are coming into urban agglomerations like Bangalore. Or asking corporations to set up centres in other cities to decongest metropolises. Unfortunately, it doesn’t work that way. Cities have networks, provide opportunities, and reduce transaction costs. Cities aren’t built by diktats. They grow organically, and bigger cities are the surest way to improve economic and social mobility. We must find ways to govern them better. But how? I think it is one of the most important public policy issues for India in the next decade. Right now it looks almost insoluble. Talking of insoluble, I read this piece of Janan Ganesh in the Financial Times about the blight of insoluble problems facing the world today that made me wonder whether worrying about them is an optimistic or a cynical stance:
“This is the era of the insoluble problem. Consider the baby bust. Birth rates in rich countries are too low to maintain populations at their current level. You needn’t take a Muskian view of this trend (“a much bigger risk to civilisation than global warming”) to want to change it. How, though? If subsidised childcare and other pronatalist policies made a difference, Nordic nations would be ultra-fertile. As it is, Sweden and Denmark have the same birth rate as the US. Governments could offer unprecedented cash incentives to procreate, but at huge upfront fiscal cost, and the pique of non-parents. Which leaves the state with what policy instrument? Moral exhortation?
At some point, the childless or one-child trend has to be seen for what it is: a byproduct of affluence and secularisation. Undoing these things, even if we were minded to, would require a bizarre kind of government.
There are such things as intractable problems. There is such a thing as rational despair. Saying so marks one out as callous. But not saying so, pretending that all questions have answers, is worse, because if a problem persists, it must mean that politicians are incompetent or don’t care. From an essentially positive premise — that nothing is beyond human ingenuity — we arrive at a cynical and acrimonious atmosphere.”
Rational despair, indeed.
India Policy Watch #2: Insoluble Alcohol Excise Problems
Policy issues relevant to India
— Pranay Kotasthane
Watching the Delhi Excise Policy saga unfold gives me a horrible feeling of déjà vu. It reminds me of the infamous 2G “scam”, in which a presumptive loss of ₹1.76 lakh crores in spectrum allocation was conjured out of thin air. The CBI arrested the then telecom minister on corruption charges. Six years later, in 2017, the court absolved him of the charges.
From a policy perspective, this turn of events also resembles the Farm Laws reform saga of circa 2020. In both cases, a progressive policy reform was buried due to poor politics by the governments in charge. I analysed the Excise Policy in edition #182 after it was suspended in August 2022. My assessment was that the government was trying to tap into two revenue sources with that reform. By getting the government out of alcohol retail and distributing those licenses to private players instead, it was trying to mop up revenue from licensing fees. Second, by allowing shops to offer discounts below the Maximum Retail Price (MRP), permitting shops to stay open till 3 am, and authorising bars to serve alcohol in licensed open spaces, it was trying to generate higher excise duty revenue.
However, like in the case of the farm laws, it tried to rush this reform without aligning the cognitive maps of powerful rent-seekers. The policy status quo had powerful defenders, many of whom ganged up against the Delhi government.
There were also some transient-state shocks which the government failed to anticipate. Some dealers started giving deep discounts to capture the market. That led the government to change the no-MRP policy to a “discount only up to 25% of MRP” policy. After that, retailers started offering “buy one bottle, get another free”. And hence, big dealers could attract more customers, while the smaller ones were finding it difficult to compete. Some licenses didn’t attract any buyers at all. Even though the steady-state promised to be a lot better, the Delhi government made the cardinal mistake of pausing the policy implementation amidst the criticism.
Then came the political pushback.
Based on the news reports surrounding the case, there seem to be three sets of charges against the policy. The first one concerns notional loss to the exchequer. These charges, as in the 2G case, don’t seem to hold water, especially because the policy was in force only for eight months. At best, they led to a drop in collection during the botched-up transition phase. The second set of charges alleges favouritism in the allocation of licenses. The truth can be uncovered only by the courts. But at this stage, any thinking Indian would not even shrug her shoulders if you were to say that license allocations involve favouritism and clientelism in India. The third set of charges alleges that the money gathered from this policy change was used to influence elections in Punjab and Goa, again a charge that can only be proven by the courts.
Whatever the direction this case takes, two policy consequences strike me. First, no state government will touch its alcohol excise policy with a bargepole for years. Second, I wonder if the Delhi government is reaping what it sowed in the name of anti-corruption.
P.S.: I’m not equipped to assess the political ramifications of the Delhi CM’s arrests. For that, I point you to two articles. Pratap Bhanu Mehta’s Indian Express article calls the arrest, in no uncertain terms, “a watershed moment in India’s slide towards a full-blown tyranny.” On the other hand, Shekhar Gupta, in his ThePrint.in piece, argues that the targeting of the AAP has reduced India to “a nation of two political forces” until 2029.
Also, here’s my interview on the In Focus by The Hindu podcast, explaining the fateful Delhi Excise Policy, in case you are wondering what all this fuss is really about.
India Policy Watch #3: Another Year, Another Paper on Inequality
Policy issues relevant to India
— Pranay Kotasthane
Have you read the new working paper on economic inequality in India? You didn’t miss much if you haven’t. In 2017, we were told that the top 1 per cent of Indians in 2014 cornered 22 per cent of Indian national income, the highest share since 1922 when the income tax was introduced. That paper was titled Indian Income Inequality, 1922-2015: From British Raj to Billionaire Raj? In the latest update to this paper, the question mark has gone away, and the authors confidently tell us that “the ‘Billionaire Raj’ headed by India’s modern bourgeoisie is now more unequal than the British Raj headed by the colonialist forces.”
There are four things of note in the latest update.
First, the authors claim to have resolved the methodological problems with Indian data this time around. Many public finance experts panned the previous version of the paper for relying on survey data to estimate the incomes of the non-rich but relying on income tax data to estimate the incomes of the rich. Swaminathan Aiyar had written a detailed note on the discrepancies back then, arguing that surveys may underestimate incomes and consumption (try asking a person how much they earn and if they own any wealth). However, the authors insist that “there is no prima facie reason to believe surveys necessarily underestimate a larger fraction of incomes than tax data.” Note that the authors don’t provide any evidence to reject Aiyar’s hypothesis.
Leaving the methodological problems aside, it’s not unreasonable to believe that the income share of the top 1 per cent of Indians might have increased in recent years. The K-shaped recovery post-COVID-19 and a spate of pro-business policies—instead of pro-market ones—have increased the market power of a few conglomerates. The reduction in competition should worry us all. On this count, the report does its job.
Nevertheless, to argue that today’s India is more unequal than the British Raj is testing the limits of tone deafness. I mean, can someone say with a straight face that the life outcomes of a non-rich Indian relative to a rich Indian today are worse than during colonial rule? I am sure such comparisons are deliberately deployed to ‘shock and awe’ the proletariat out of their collective slumber, but they have the opposite effect of reducing the paper’s credibility. Such comparisons might act as a tool in the hands of those who already believe in the gospel of inequality but do little to convince those who are at the margin.
My biggest disappointment is when the authors transform into policy analysts, recommending a two-percent “super tax” on the net wealth of the richest Indian families. Wealth taxes have several problems. India did have a wealth tax that failed miserably. This is a favourite topic of ours, and we have several editions discussing why wealth taxes are inefficient and ineffective. Given that the adverse consequences of wealth taxes are so well-known, I expected that the authors would at least anticipate the unintended consequences and suggest ways to mitigate them. Instead, we get an ideological defence of a predetermined policy idea rather than an empirical one.
The solution to income inequality is more competition, not Robin Hood taxes.
P.S.: Bertrand Russell’s insight is relevant to this discussion.
What I do think is this, if a philosophy is to bring happiness, it should be inspired by kindly feeling. Now, Marx is not inspired by a kindly feeling. Marx pretended that he wanted the happiness of the proletariat, what he really wanted was the unhappiness of the Bourgeois. And it was because of that negative element, because of that hate element, that his philosophy produced disaster. A philosophy which aims to go good must be one inspired by kindly feeling, and not by unkindly feeling.
HomeWork
Reading and listening recommendations on public policy matters
[Podcast] Check out our Puliyabaazi on road safety, road design, and on-road behaviour in India, featuring Rahul Goel, co-author of the excellent Road Safety in India, Status Report 2023.
[Paper] In this book review article for the Indian Public Policy Review, we explain why wealth tax is a daft idea.
This is the first time in a long time that I disagree with RSJ. Apple, specifically, has a kind of lock-in in the States (and increasingly in India) which cannot be bypassed. The network effect of iMessage and Facetime is very large. Once you have a group of people you communicate with only on iMessage you cannot move platforms. It sounds trite. Just move to WhatsApp is the default exhortation, but in the States, that is often not an option, one, and two, one segregates chat apps for multiple reasons. And that is to say nothing about Apple restricting payment methods in its App Store, which, on the iPhone, is a monopoly. While one may agree that breaking Apple up might be extreme, to state that consumers have a choice is slightly farcical. Consumers have to buy apps through the App Store. That is something most are happy to do: the advantages over the comparitive Wild West in the land of Android are clear and welcome, but one would prefer to have that choice and exercise it rather than have it thrust upon them.
Also, a typo: the FTC commissioner is Lina Khan, not Hina Khan.
RSJ makes several points regarding Apple and Amazon antitrust actions; I respond to those below.
Timing of case filing
Whether political signaling, happenstance, or otherwise, this is in the realm of speculation. An important reason to bring the case during a particular President’s term is to put forth the economic logic for the case that the administration agrees with. An antitrust case brought by a Democratic administration may have different contours (and chances of victory) than that by a Republican administration, even when both have a problem with the alleged monopolist. Investigations and putting together a case can take years. The DoJ’s investigation during the Biden years can only come to fruition if the case is brought during the term.
Apple’s monopoly
The gist of RSJ’s argument is that (a) customers have choice and yet, buy iPhones/iPads; (b) Apple’s “strange alchemy of design chops, innovation and brand image” makes it worth it; (c) customers can leave any time; (d) Apple is better at protecting customer data through tight control over ecosystem; (e) “go full tilt at breaking it up” is an extreme remedy.
Unfortunately, RSJ does not appear to know or appreciate the logic of American antitrust. Any antitrust case is made of 3 parts – liability (possession of monopoly in a properly defined product and geographic market); causation (that the monopoly was illegally acquired or maintained, shown with evidence of specific actions; and relief (whether fines or structural remedies).
Read the original DOJ complaint - https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1344546/dl?inline. The Table of Contents shows that the complaint is written in conformance with the antitrust textbook. The DOJ lays out contours of the case, includes anecdotes, and provides background on Apple and platforms (Sections I-III). It carefully defines the market as “performance smartphones in the US” (main position) or “smartphones in the US” as alternative position (section VII). It lists specific actions by Apple by which Apple “unlawfully maintains its monopoly power” in the defined market (section IV). It shows anticompetitive effects (section V). It addresses alternative explanations (section VI), establishes jurisdiction and venue (section VIII) and lastly, alleges specific violations of law and requests appropriate relief (sections IX and X).
First, RSJ gets it wrong by saying DOJ wants to “break it up”– the “request for relief” on page 76 merely seeks that the Court adjudge Apple to have “acted unlawfully to monopolize/ attempted to monopolize the smartphone/performance smartphone market in the United States” and “enter relief as needed to cure any anticompetitive harm” and seeks to prevent Apple from continuing the challenged practices (control over app distribution, private APIs, and contractual terms”. Nowhere does the DOJ ask the court to break up Apple. In fact, while some in the DOJ prefer structural remedies like breakups, this article states that DOJ has been careful to not address the exact remedies they will seek.
Second, RSJ is judging the case by saying “there’s no monopoly Apple has for any customer to choose an iPhone or iPad to begin with” before evidence from both sides is heard. The whole point of DOJ’s case to have a court examine the market definition, and the pro- and anti-competitive arguments. It remains to be seen whether DOJ’s argument that Apple unlawfully maintains its monopoly power over smartphones/performance smartphones by (a) contractual restrictions, fees, and taxes on app creation and distribution; (b) uses APIs to control behavior and innovation of third-parties; and (c) Apple’s smartphone moat is wide and deep and extends to other products.
The DOJ has not alleged that Apple acquired the alleged monopoly illegally. It is a maintenance of monopoly case.
RSJ’s points are essentially the case Apple will make:
(a) it will define a product market bigger than DOJ’s definition of “performance smartphones” and US as relevant geographic market;
(b) it will submit its innovation and privacy practices as the reason consumers pay a premium;
(c) it will likely argue technical and consumer benefit reasons for design choices it has made with respect to APIs, app store, and interoperability with other devices/ platforms;
(d) it will submit evidence of customer switching, and say no “lock-in”
Whether the DOJ has sufficient evidence, or whether Apple can persuade the court that its actions are legal will only be known through the litigation process.
PS: tablets are excluded from the DOJ’s market definition, so iPads are not even a subject of the case!
Lina Khan and Amazon
RSJ makes two points regarding FTC’s Amazon case – that a predatory pricing case presupposes future harms and that Lina Khan’s regret at not being able to “make the victims whole”. Additionally, RSJ objects to Lina Khan’s broad definition of the role of antitrust to “safeguard against concentrations of economic power”.
Khan has made these points throughout her career. Interested readers can refer to her very readable paper Amazon’s antitrust paradox- https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/e.710.Khan.805_zuvfyyeh.pdf.
I agree with RSJ that there are several problems with Khan’s arguments – at least in her paper, Lina Khan’s critique of Bork-era “consumer welfare” standard is not fully-formed and has lacunae. Preemptive regulatory action can cause harm and any preemptive action does have Orwellian aspects. Moreover, Amazon hasn’t always been successful and coming up with a coherent product market definition for Amazon is very difficult.
That said, Khan is correct on a lot of counts, especially the nature of platform economics. The problem of platform regulation stems not just from the behavior of platform companies, but also from insufficient progress on an economic theory of platforms.
Traditional microeconomics, with its “widget” factories, has described markets of “products” and “services” which for the most part are devoid of externalities/ scale economics. Externalities are added on later, as a complexity to be dealt with.
Common carrier/utility regulation attempts to address these for things like fax machines, telephone networks, etc. However, platforms are an odd beast where the demand-supply economics runs into limits. Multi-sided platforms combine externalities/scale economic with agents on multiple sides causing the conventional “price = marginal cost” in a competitive market to no longer be valid due to different amounts of market power and corresponding variance pricing decisions on different sides of the market. Simply put, it is far more difficult to determine abuse of power in such markets.
Economics literature and practice needs to evolve to address this, and however illogical “predatory pricing” may appear and however abhorrent preemptive action may seem, there is a lot of evidence that platform power in technology markets is hard to dislodge and Khan is right about such lasting concentration of power. “three decades” as RSJ argues may be short, but there can be plenty of harm within such a time period. Francis Fukuyama has argued that Amazon’s role in diminished downtowns across the US, while outside the strict consumer welfare standard and evidence of pricing, needs to be examined at a broader-than-Bork level in terms of its effects on society.
RSJ’s argument that “for going back in time and extracting money out of these enterprises for supposedly running a monopoly in the past when there was no case against them” is misguided and somewhat contradicts his own position against preemptive action.
DOJ/FTC bring cases post-facto, and if illegal acquisition/maintenance of monopoly is proven, both financial and structural remedies can be provided by courts. While consumers do not get “made whole” directly, indirect benefits do accrue. And in many cases, follow-on consumer class action cases from these victories (whether direct purchasers or indirect) can actually deter companies through financial awards to consumers (the US Government’s Microsoft cases were followed by consumer class actions in many states and did cost Microsoft several billion dollars), going back in time within permitted time windows.
As long as laws are in-place through the entire period, there can be no rational expectation for a firm to argue that they cannot take “ex-ante decisions” – firms hire expensive lawyers and economists precisely to estimate the risk when making product and pricing decisions!